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COMMENTS

The Dilemma of Chance in Medical
Malpractice: Should Illinois Recognize a
New Cause of Action for "Lost Chance"
of Survivability?
I.

INTRODUCTION

John Sloane, a law student at an Illinois university, woke one
morning with a dry, hacking cough and severe chest pains. He was
so troubled by these symptoms that he visited the University Health
Center. The physician on call, Dr. Wellbee, examined him briefly and
ordered a chest x-ray and bronchoscopy. The test results revealed a
stage one, malignant lung tumor. At that moment, Sloane's chances
of survival, with proper medical treatment, were only forty-nine
percent. However, Dr. Wellbee misread the results and diagnosed
Sloane as suffering from bronchitis. He wrote Sloane a prescription
for antibiotics and told him "Don't worry, it should clear up soon."
Four months passed and Sloane's condition worsened. He finally
consulted his family physician who discovered that the cancer had
progressed to a stage two level, from which only twenty-five percent
of all cancer patients recover. Sloane eventually died from cancer,
despite extensive and painful medical treatment.
Sloane's estate thereafter brought a medical malpractice action
against Dr. Wellbee for wrongfully causing the death. At trial, expert
testimony indicated that Dr. Wellbee deviated from accepted medical
practice in misinterpreting the test results and his negligence cost
Sloane a twenty-four percent chance of surviving the cancer. However,
Dr. Wellbee denied liability on the grounds that his negligence was
not the actual cause of the death, since Sloane had a less than even
chance of recovery. Consequently, Dr. Wellbee petitioned the court
for summary judgment in his favor.
In this scenario, the trial court judge is faced with a dilemma. If
he dismisses the case, Sloane's estate will recover nothing, even though
clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that the doctor's negligence cost Sloane a twenty-four percent chance of survival. In contrast, if the case is allowed to go to the jury, Dr. Wellbee may be
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held liable for the full wrongful death damages even though Sloane
probably would have died without any negligence on the physician's
part.
The Illinois appellate courts faced with such decisions have
focused primarily on the element of causation. Presently, they apply
two different standards for allowing this issue to get to the jury.'
Under the first approach, the judge would not allow the case to reach
the jury since the plaintiff cannot prove that Sloane had a better than
even chance of recovery. 2 In contrast, the other standard applies a
lower burden of production. 3 It would permit the jury to decide the
case since the evidence indicates that the doctor's negligence increased
the risk of Sloane dying of cancer.
Even if the plaintiff reaches the jury, he may not be compensated
for the loss he actually suffered. Under current Illinois law, juries
applying either standard of causation generally award damages on an
"all-or-nothing" basis. 4 Thus the plaintiff either receives the "wind1. The majority of Illinois appellate jurisdictions follow the "reasonable
probability" standard, which requires the plaintiff to show causation by a preponderance of evidence before the issue can get to the jury. See Curry v. Summer, 136
Ill. App. 3d 468, 483 N.E.2d 711 (4th Dist. 1985), cert. denied; Russell v. Subbiah,
149 Ill.
App. 3d 268, 500 N.E.2d 138 (3d Dist. 1986), cert. denied; Wise v. Saint
Mary's Hosp., 64 Il.App. 3d 587, 381 N.E.2d 809 (5th Dist. 1978). The First
Appellate District, however, has adopted the "increased risk of harm" standard.
This standard allows the plaintiff to reach the jury only by showing that the
defendant's conduct increased the risk that the damage would occur. See Chambers
v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 155 Ill.
App. 3d 458, 508 N.E.2d
426 (1st Dist. 1987), cert. denied; Northern Trust Co. v. Louis A. Weiss Memorial
Hosp., 143 Ill.
App. 3d 479, 493 N.E.2d 6 (1st Dist. 1986).
2. See Curry, 136 Ill.
App. 3d 468, 483 N.E.2d 711; Russell, 149 Ill. App. 3d
268, 500 N.E.2d 138; Wise, 64 Ill. App. 3d 587, 381 N.E.2d 809.
3. See Chambers, 155 Ill. App. 3d 458, 508 N.E.2d 426; Northern Trust Co.,
143 Il1. App. 3d 479, 493 N.E.2d 6.
4. See King, Causation, Valuation and Chance in Personal Injury Torts
Involving Pre-Existing Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L. J. 1352,
1356 (1981) [hereinafter King] ("The causation inquiry has traditionally had an allor-nothing effect on the outcome of a tort claim. Unless a causal connection is
established under the applicable standard of proof ... the plaintiff will receive
nothing for the loss in question"); Note, Increased Risk of Harm: A New Standard
of Sufficiency for Evidence of Causation in Medical Malpractice Cases, 65 B.U.L.
REv. 275, 303 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Increased Risk of Harm] ("Once causation
is satisfied under the 'all-or-nothing' approach, total responsibility is credited to the
party charged with the injury. Apportionment of the damages based on the contribution of the pre-existing disease is not considered."). None of the Illinois cases
involving "lost chance" have awarded plaintiff damages proportional to the amount
of damage actually caused by the defendant's negligence. See supra notes 2 and 3.
Consequently they have retained the "all-or-nothing" method of loss valuation.
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fall" of full wrongful death damages or is foreclosed from recovering
for his loss. Consequently, in cases where only a chance of survival

has been destroyed, this method of loss allocation derogates the basic
premise of tort law which states that a plaintiff should be compensated
for the loss he actually sustained.5
However, a new tort doctrine, "Lost Chance, '

6

views the prob-

lem primarily as one of valuation rather than causation. The "Lost
Chance" doctrine attempts to ameliorate the above-mentioned ineq-

uities by creating a new cause of action. 7 This tort would compensate
plaintiffs for the chance of survivability they have lost due to the
malpractice. 8 The amount of damages that a plaintiff could recover
would reflect the magnitude of this lost chance. 9

This Comment examines whether the "Lost Chance" doctrine

should be applied in Illinois medical malpractice cases. Part II examines the current causation standards applied by the various state

and federal jurisdictions in medical malpractice cases. Part III focuses

on the state of current Illinois case law on the topic of "lost chance."
Finally, Part IV provides specific suggestions for revising Illinois law
concerning "lost chance" in medical malpractice cases.
5. See McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp. Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 476 (Okla. 1987)
(A plaintiff should recover only for those damages that are proximately caused by

the defendant's breach of duty); Note, Playing the Percentages: A Re-Examination
of Recovery for Loss of Chance, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 429, 431 n.13 (1986)

[hereinafter Note, Playing the Percentages] ("[In "lost chance" cases] a victim should
be entitled to compensation regardless of whether he or she is living or deceased, and
regardless of whether the defendant's negligence caused the victim's death.").
6. At the present time, a growing number of jurisdictions have adopted the
"Lost Chance" doctrine, see Mays v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 1476 (D.C. Colo.
1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3184 (1987) (applying Colorado law); Sharp v. Kaiser
Found. Health Plan, 710 P.2d 1153 (Colo. App. 1985), aff'd, 741 P.2d 714 (Colo.
1987); DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1986); Roberson v. Counselman,
686 P.2d 149 (Kan. 1984); Aasheim v. Humberger, 695 P.2d 824 (Mont. 1985);
McKellips, 741 P.2d at 474. A number of commentators have also advocated its
adoption as a more equitable method of allocating compensation. See C. McCoRMICK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGEs, 117-23 (1935); King, supra note 4, at 1376;

Wolfstone & Wolfstone, Recovery of Damages for the Loss of a Chance, 28 MED.
TRIAL TECH. Q. 121 (1982) [hereinafter Wolfstone & WolfstoneJ; Note, Playing the
Percentages, supra note 5, at 454.

7. See King, supra note 4, at 1354.
8. Id.

9. See McKellips, 741 P.2d at 476 ("The amount of damages recoverable [in
"loss of chance" actions] is equal to the percent of the chance lost multiplied by the
total amount of damages which are ordinarily allowed in a wrongful death action");
Mays, 608 F. Supp. at 1482-83 (compensation in "lost chance" action calculated as
the total loss multiplied by the percentage of the damages resulting from the
malpractice).
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II. OVERVIEW
A.

CAUSE IN FACT IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS

In medical malpractice causes of action, the plaintiff must prove
the defendant breached a duty owed to him by being unskillful or
negligent in providing treatment.l0 A doctor does not breach this duty
merely because he makes a misdiagnosis or mistake in treatment. The
mistake must be of such magnitude that it violates the accepted
standard of medical treatment."
A malpractice plaintiff must also show that the defendant's lack
of due care was the cause of the injury. 12 A physician is not liable

10. See Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 60 Ill. 2d 418, 423, 328 N.E.2d 301, 304-05
(1975) ("[P]laintiff ... must establish the standards of care against which the
defendant doctor's conduct is measured. The plaintiff must then further prove by
affirmative evidence that, judged in light of these standards, the doctor was unskillful
or negligent and that his want of skill or care caused the injury to the plaintiff.");
Scardina v. Colletti, 63 111. App. 2d 481, 488, 211 N.E.2d 762, 765 (1965) ("In a
malpractice action a physician will be held responsible for injuries resulting from his
want of reasonable care, skill and diligence in his practice.").
11. See Holtzman v. Hoy, 118 Ill. 534, 8 N.E. 832 (1886).
The duty which the defendant, as a physician and surgeon, owed the plaintiff
was to bring to the case . . . that degree of knowledge, skill and care which

a good physician and surgeon would bring to a similar case under like
circumstances. While this rule, on the one hand, does not exact the highest
degree of skill and proficiency attainable in the profession, it does not, on
the other hand, contemplate merely average merit.
Id. at 536, 8 N.W.2d at 832. See also Boyce v. Brown, 51 Ariz. 416, 77 P.2d 455
(1938) (one licensed to practice medicine is presumed to have the degree of skill or
learning possessed by the average member of the medical profession and apply this
skill with due care); Wade v. Ravenswood Hosp. Ass'n, 3 Ill. App. 2d 102, 120
N.E.2d 345 (1954) (if a doctor has given the patient his best judgment, assuming that
judgment is equal to that ordinarily used by reasonably well qualified doctors in
similar cases, he is not liable for malpractice).
12. The law divides the element of causation into the two components of cause
in fact and proximate cause. Cause in fact refers to the cause-effect relationship
between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury. See W. KEETON, D.
DOBBS,

R.

KEETON

& D. OWEN, PROSSER &

KEETON ON TORTS

§ 41, at 264-65 (5th

ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. In contrast, proximate cause refers to the
rules of law which limit the scope of a defendant's liability for his otherwise tortious
acts. Generally, a defendant is liable only for the foreseeable consequences of his
actions. See id. at § 41, 264. "Lost Chance" cases primarily center on the issue of
causation in fact. "Proximate cause is not a major problem in cases involving a loss
of chance ....

Once [causation in fact] ...

is established, juries have little difficulty

in finding proximate cause." Note, Playing the Percentages, supra note 5, at 433
n.27. Consequently, this Comment focuses on the element of causation in fact.
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for malpractice solely because his patient suffered injuries. 3 The
plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct was the cause in
fact of the damages.' 4
The traditional test of causation in fact is the "but for" or "sine
qua non" test. Under this test, causation exists if the evidence indicates
the plaintiff's injury would not have resulted but for the defendant's

tortious actions.15 However, the RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS

has

advocated the adoption of the "substantial factor" test as a replacement for the "but for" test. 16 Under this test, the defendant's actions
are considered a cause of the victim's harm if it can be shown that
they were a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. 17 This
approach employs the traditional "but for" analysis of causation
except in situations where two or more independent forces combine
to cause the plaintiff's injury and each alone would have been
sufficient to bring about the damage."
In medical malpractice cases, the plaintiff bears the burden of
proving causation in fact as part of his prima facie case.19 Traditionally, this burden has been sub-divided into the categories of production
and persuasion. 20 For the plaintiff to meet the burden of production,

13. See Scardina v. Colletti, 63 Ill. App. 2d 481, 488, 211 N.E.2d 762, 765
(1965) ("It is not enough to prove that [a defendant] ... made a mistake or that his

treatment harmed the plaintiff; proof of a bad result or mishap is no evidence of

lack of skill or negligence."); Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 14 Ill. App. 3d 672, 679,
303 N.E.2d 146, 151 (1973), aff'd, 60 Ill. 2d 418, 328 N.E.2d 301 (1975) ("The case
law in Illinois requires more than proof of a bad result, for mere proof that a good
result was not obtained is, of itself, no proof of negligence or lack of skill.").
14. See Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 60 Ill. 2d 418, 328 N.E.2d 301 (1975) (the
plaintiff must prove that the negligence was the cause of the injury); Wise v. St.
Mary's Hosp., 64 Ill. App. 3d 587, 381 N.E.2d 809 (5th Dist. 1978) (plaintiff must
prove not only that the defendant was negligent, but also that this negligence was
the cause of his injury).
15. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, at 266 ("The defendant's conduct
is a cause of the event if the event would not have occurred but for that conduct.").

16. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 431 (1965) ("The actor's negligent

conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor
in bringing about the harm .....
17. Id. at § 432.
18. See Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & St. M. R. R. Co., 146 Minn. 430,
179 N.W. 45 (1920). This case presents the classic example of the substantial factor
test. Two fires, both of different origin, converged to destroy the plaintiff's property.
Either fire by itself would have been sufficient to cause the harm. Both of the
defendants who started the fires were held liable.
19. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 at 236 (4th ed. 1971).
20. McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp. Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 471 (Okla. 1987).
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he must present evidence of sufficient quantity and weight that a
reasonable person would be able to believe a causal connection exists. 21
This connection is often difficult to prove in medical malpractice
cases, especially those involving "loss of chance." Plaintiffs in these
cases have a pre-existing illness or disability when they seek treatment
from the defendant. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to separate
the degree to which the plaintiff's injuries resulted from the defendant's alleged malpractice from the amount of damage caused by the
underlying illness. 22 If the evidence of causation is insufficient, the
judge would dismiss the case or direct a verdict for the defendant. 23
However, if the plaintiff is able to pass this test, he is still faced with
the burden of persuading the jury by a preponderance of evidence
24
that his allegations are true.

B.

CURRENT STANDARDS OF CAUSATION IN "LOST CHANCE" CASES

Courts have been divided on the issue of how much causal
evidence a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action must produce to
meet the burden of production. 2 At the present time, state and federal
jurisdictions utilize three different standards of causation in "lost
chance" cases. They are the "reasonable probability," the "substantial possibility" and the "increased risk of harm" standards. 26 Each
A plaintiff's burden of proof of causation is twofold. First, a plaintiff has
the burden of producing evidence satisfactory to a judge, that a reasonable
person could believe in the existence of the causal link and that the evidence
should be weighed by the jury .... Secondly, a plaintiff bears the burden
of persuasion should the evidence be allowed to reach the jury.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also C. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336 at 947 (3d ed.

1984) [hereinafter MCCORMICK].
21. MCCORMCK, supra note 20, § 336 at 947.

22. See McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp. Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 471-72 (Okla.
1987) ("Often times these cases are problematic as the tort may prevent a determination of whether the exercise of due care under the circumstances could have
produced a better result." (footnotes omitted)); D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
165 (1973) ("Because the patient usually suffers from an existing ailment prior to the
treatment in question, a common defense to a charge of negligent conduct is So
What?") (emphasis in original); Note, IncreasedRisk of Harm, supra note 4, at 275
("The patient's existing condition makes it difficult to distinguish the effects of the
physician's negligent action from the natural results of the plaintiff's disease.").
23. MCCORMICK, supra note 20, § 338 at 952-53.
24. Id. § 336 at 947.
25. See Annotation, Medical Malpractice: "Loss of Chance" Causality, 54
A.L.R.4th 10 (1987).
26. See Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, Inc., 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97
(1971) (plaintiff must show causation to a "reasonable probability" to meet the
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of these approaches differ in the amount of causal evidence the
plaintiff must produce before this issue is allowed to reach the jury.
1. Reasonable Probability
The majority of state jurisdictions apply the "reasonable probability" standard in medical malpractice cases. 27 Under this approach,
the plaintiff must prove it is more likely than not that the defendant's
tortious act caused his injury before the jury is allowed to hear the
case. 2 The leading case cited for this standard is Cooper v. Sisters of
29

Charity, Inc.

In Cooper, a sixteen-year-old boy was struck by a truck while
riding his bicycle. 30 The emergency room doctor failed to diagnose a
basal skull fracture and consequently, the child did not receive needed
surgery. 3' He subsequently died due to intracranial swelling and
hemorrhages caused by the untreated fracture.12 The boy's mother
burden of production); Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966) (case
should be allowed to go to the jury if evidence indicates the defendant's actions
destroyed a "substantial possibility" of recovery); Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. Super.
256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1973) (burden of production is met on the issue of causation if
the plaintiff shows the defendant's conduct resulted in an "increased risk of harm").
27. See Rewis v. United States, 503 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying New
Mexico law); Bryant v. Rankin, 468 F.2d 510 (8th Cir. 1972) (applying Iowa law);
Poertner v. Swearingen, 695 F.2d 435 (10th Cir. 1982) (applying Colorado law);
Davis v. Kemp, 252 Ark. 925, 481 S.W.2d 712 (1972); Morgenroth v. Pacific Med.
Ctr. Inc., 54 Cal. App. 3d 521, 126 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1976); Davidson v. Miller, 276
Md. 54, 344 A.2d 422 (1975); Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg. Inc., 445 So.2d
1015 (Fla. 1984); Curry v. Summer, 136 Ill. App. 3d 468, 483 N.E.2d 711 (4th Dist.
1985), cert. denied; Townsend v. Stamper, 398 S.W.2d 45 (Ky. 1965); Cornfeldt v.
Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 1980); Clayton v. Thompson, 475 So. 2d 439 (Miss.
1985); Pillsbury-Flood v. Portsmouth Hosp., 128 N.H. 299, 512 A.2d 1126 (1986);
Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, Inc., 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971); Shenck
v. Rodger Williams Gen. Hosp., 119 R.I. 510, 382 A.2d 514 (R.I. 1977); Hanselman
v. McCardle, 275 S.C. 46, 267 S.E.2d 531 (1980); Blakeman v. Gopp, 364 P.2d 986
(Wyo. 1961).
28. See Curry v. Summer, 136 Ill. App. 3d 468, 480, 483 N.E.2d 711, 719 (3d
Dist. 1985) (plaintiff must show causation by a preponderance of evidence before
this issue can reach the jury), cert. denied; Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg. Inc.,
445 So.2d 1015, 1018 (Fla. 1984) (burden of proof on the issue of causation requires
the plaintiff to show it is more likely than not the defendant's tortious actions were
the cause of plaintiff's injury).
29. 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971).
30. Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, Inc., 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 243-44, 272 N.E.2d
97, 98-99 (1971).
31. Id. at 243-44, 272 N.E.2d at 99.
32. Id. at 244, 272 N.E.2d at 99.
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brought an action against the doctor for negligently causing the child's
death.

At trial, the plaintiff's expert witness testified that in cases like

the decedent's, there was a one-hundred percent mortality rate without
surgery. However, if surgery had been performed, the child would
have had approximately a fifty percent chance of survival.33 The trial
court granted a directed verdict for the defendant on the grounds that

causation in fact had not been shown.34 The Supreme Court of Ohio

affirmed, holding "to conform with the standard of proof of proxi-

mate cause,35 plaintiff in a malpractice case must prove that defen-

dant's negligence, in probability, proximately caused the death ....

[P]robable is more than 50% of actual.

3' 6

The "reasonable probability" standard, adopted in Cooper, possesses both strengths and weaknesses. The approach is faithful to
established causation principles in that it utilizes the "but for" analysis
of cause in fact.3 7 Consequently, the jury is provided with at least

minimal evidence that the plaintiff's loss would not have occurred

but for the tortious conduct of the defendant.38 Without this required
level of evidence, the jury Would be forced to speculate on whether
the decedent would have survived if the defendant had not been
negligent.3 9
33. Id. at 247, 272 N.E.2d at 101.
34. Id. at 245, 272 N.E.2d at 99.

35. Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, Inc., 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 252-53, 272 N.E.2d

97, 103-04 (1971). Although the court used the expression "proximate cause" it was
actually referring to causation in fact. See Note, Negligence-Medical MalpracticeShould Lack of a Diagnosis Resulting in Loss of Chance Be A Compensable Injury?,
3 SETON HALL L. REv. 505, 507 (1972) ("Although the Cooper court spoke of the
plaintiff's burden in terms of "proximate cause it is important to note that the
problem more fundamentally was that of proving causation-in-fact."). For purposes
of this article where the term "causation" is used, it will refer to the element of
cause in fact unless otherwise noted.
36. Cooper, 27 Ohio St. 2d at 252-53, 272 N.E.2d at 103-04 (emphasis in
original).
37. Id. at 253, 272 N.E.2d at 104.
38. See King, supra note 4, at 1377.
39. See Curry v. Summer 136 I11.
App. 3d 468, 479, 483 N.E.2d 711, 718-19

(4th Dist. 1985) ("Without proof that the defendant's negligence more likely than
not caused the plaintiff's injury, the jury would have to engage in speculation .... ),
cert. denied; Cooper v. Sisters of Charity Inc., 27 Ohio St. 242, 251, 272 N.E.2d 97,
103 (1971) ("Traditional proximate cause standards require that the trier of the facts,
at a minimum, must be provided with evidence that a result was more likely than
not to have been caused by an act, in the absence of any intervening cause."); Note,
Playing the Percentages, supra note 5, at 435 ("While some speculation is inherent
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Although the rule is in accord with accepted principles of cau-

sation, in many cases it violates the basic tort axiom that a plaintiff

should be compensated for the damages he suffered due to the
defendant's negligence.4 In cases such as Cooper, where the decedent
had a less than even chance of survival, plaintiffs are foreclosed from

recovery. 4' Yet, if the plaintiff's expert witness testified that the child

would have had a fifty-one percent chance of recovery without
surgery, the issue of causation would have reached the jury. Thus, a

one percent difference in survival rate would have avoided a dismissal
of the plaintiff's case. Since the standard bars plaintiffs from reaching
the jury where the causal evidence does not meet the arbitrary fiftyone percent level, it inequitably allocates substantial loss to the victim
42
rather than the negligent tortfeasr.
Since these plaintiffs are denied compensation, the rule also
diminishes the deterrent value of tort law. 43 As long as the decedent
has less than an even chance of recovery, defendants are insulated
from liability for their tortious acts. The rule, in effect, would provide
"a blanket release from liability for doctors and hospitals any time
there was less than a 50 percent chance of survival, regardless of how
flagrant the negligence.'44

2.

SubstantialPossibility

A limited number of jurisdictions have attempted to avoid the
inequities arising from the "reasonable probability" approach by
applying the "substantial possibility" standard of causation.4 5 Under
in any standard of proof, the preponderance standard at least requires the plaintiff
to prove what probably happened. Lower standards of proof do not reach this
probability level and the jury must guess what might have happened had the defendant
not been negligent.").
40. See Note, Playing the Percentages, supra note 5, at 445.

41. Id.
42. See King, supra note 4, at 1377 ("A failure to allocate the cost of these
losses to their tortious sources undermines the whole range of functions served by
the causation-valuation process and strikes at the integrity of the torts system of
allocation.").
43. See Note, Playing the Percentages, supra note 5, at 451.

44. Herskovits v. Group Health Co-op., 99 Wash. 2d 609, 616, 664 P.2d 474,
477 (1983). See also Robertson v. Counselman, 235 Kan. 1006, 1021, 686 P.2d 149,
160 (1984) ("[The 'reasonable probability' standard], in essence, declares open season
on critically ill or injured persons as care providers would be free of liability for even
the grossest malpractice if the patient had only a fifty-fifty chance of surviving the
disease or injury even with proper treatment.").
45. The majority of courts applying this standard have been federal jurisdic-
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this rule, the burden of production is met if the plaintiff can prove
the defendant's actions deprived him of a "substantial possibility" of
a better recovery rather than a "reasonable probability." The standard, therefore, allows the case to reach the jury on a minimal level
of causal evidence.
Hicks v. United States6 is the leading case cited in support of
the "substantial possibility" standard. In Hicks, the decedent was
brought to the dispensary of a Naval hospital, complaining of severe
abdominal pain.4 The physician on call performed a "partial and

very hurried" examination, misdiagnosed her condition as stomach
flu and sent her home.48 However, the patient died approximately

eight hours later. An autopsy revealed the death was caused by massive

hemorrhaging of the intestine resulting from a bowel obstruction.4 9
The decedent's husband sued the United States for the wrongful
death under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346. 50 At
trial, evidence indicated the doctor violated accepted medical procedures by not examining the patient further to rule out a bowel

obstruction.51 However, the district court held that the evidence of
causation was insufficient to meet the burden of production and

dismissed the case.5 2 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed this

decision.53 The court stated:

When a defendant's negligent action or inaction has effectively

terminated a person's chance of survival, it does not lie in the
defendant's mouth to raise conjectures as to the measure of
tions. See Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966) (applying Virginia
law); Maltempo v. Culthbert, 504 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying Florida law);
Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970) (applying Arkansas law); McBride v.
United States, 462 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1972) (applying Hawaii law); Ascher v. Gutierez,
533 F.2d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (applying District of Columbia law); James v. United
States, 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (applying California law). A limited
number of state courts, however, have also followed the "substantial possibility"
rule. See Thomas v. Corso, 265 Md. 84, 288 A.2d 379 (1972); Kallenberg v. Beth
Israel Hosp., 45 A.D.2d 177, 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 37
N.Y. 719, 337 N.E.2d 128, 374 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1975); Witfield v. Wittaker, 210 Va.
176, 169 S.E.2d 563 (1969).
46. 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966).
47. Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626, 628 (4th Cir. 1966).
48. Id. at 629.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 628.
51. Id. at 629-30.
52. Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626, 629 (4th Cir. 1966).
53. Id. at 633.
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the chances that he has put beyond the possibility of realization. If there was any substantial possibility of survival and
the defendant has destroyed it, he is answerable. Rarely is it
possible to demonstrate to an absolute certainty what would
have happened in circumstances that the wrongdoer did not
allow to come to pass. The law does not in the existing
circumstances require the plaintiff to show to a certainty that
the patient would have lived had she been hospitalized and
4
operated on promptly.
This statement has been widely cited in "lost chance" cases,
however, jurisdictions have given the language opposing interpreta-6
tions. 5 One group of courts considers this statement to be dictum.1
Courts positing such a view point out that the uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff's expert witness indicated that the patient would
have survived if she had been operated on promptly. 7 Thus, the
plaintiff could have recovered under the "reasonable probability"
standard of causation then used in the jurisdiction." In this way, a
strong argument can be made that the court was merely rejecting the
"reasonable medical certainty" standard of causation5 9 and was not
abandoning the "reasonable probability" rule. 60
54. Id. at 632 (emphasis in original) (citing Harvey v. Silbert, 300 Mich. 510,

2 N.W.2d 483 (1942)).

55. See King, supra note 4, at 1368 n.53.
56. See Clark v. United States, 402 F.2d 950, 953 n.4 (4th Cir. 1968) ("Certainly
Hicks laid down no new rule of law with respect to either negligence or proximate
cause; indeed, it could not since the statute [Federal Torts Claims Act] clearly requires
us to apply the law of 'the place where the act or omission occurred.' "); Gooding
v. University Hosp. Bldg. Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1019 (Fla. 1984); McKellips v. Saint
Francis Hosp. Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 472 (Okla. 1987). See also King, supra note 4, at
1368 n.53 ("Ironically, [Hicks,] the case most often cited as a leading proponent of
the substantial possibility standard of proof in the passive-injury, preexisting-condition context endorsed that standard in dicta.").
57. See Mays v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 1476, 1480 (D.C. Colo. 1985);
Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. 99 Wash. 2d 609, 627, 664 P.2d 474, 483 (1983)
(Rosellini, J., concurring). See also Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626, 632 (4th
Cir. 1966).
58. See McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp. Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 472 (Okla. 1987)
("Even though the Hicks court used the phrase 'substantial possibility' as providing
a standard of proof, the plaintiff's evidence actually met a greater standard of
proof."). See also King, supra note 4, at 1369 n.53 ("This testimony [on the issue
of causation in fact) satisfied the more-likely-than-not standard.").
59. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
60. See Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99 Wash. 2d 609, 627, 664 P.2d
474, 483 (1983) ("Hicks v. United States . . .appears to be authority for no more
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Some courts, however, in the face of this argument, have cited
Hicks as persuasive authority for allowing the jury to decide the issue
of causation in cases where the decedent had a less than even chance
of survival. 61 Since the standard lowers the burden of production,
more plaintiffs are compensated for the losses they have suffered.
However, the jury may incorrectly impose liability where the preponderance of evidence does not indicate that the defendant's conduct
caused the death. 62 Since the majority of jurisdictions award compensation on an "all-or-nothing" basis, a defendant may be held liable
for the full wrongful death damages even in cases where he only
caused a portion of the loss. 63 For example, a defendant might have
negligently decreased a decedent's chances of survival from forty-nine
percent to nine percent by misdiagnosing his illness. If the case is
allowed to reach the jury, they might award one-hundred percent of
the wrongful death damages even though the malpractice destroyed
only a forty percent chance of recovery. In these circumstances, the
rule allocates loss as inefficiently as the "reasonable probability"
standard. The inequity has merely shifted from the plaintiff to the
defendant. 64

than the proposition that proximate cause may be established on a probability of
survival.").
61. See Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598, 605 (8th Cir. 1970); O'Brien v. Stover,
443 F.2d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 1971); James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581, 585
(N.D. Cal. 1980); Thomas v. Corso, 265 Md. 84, 101-02, 288 A.2d 379, 389-90
(1972).
62. For particularly glaring examples of this incorrect imposition of liability,
see Thomas v. Corso, 265 Md. 84, 94, 288 A.2d 379, 386 (full damages awarded
where expert testimony indicated that "only God knows" what the decedent's chances
of survival were); Kallenberg v. Beth Isreal Hosp., 45 A.D.2d 177, 357 N.Y.S.2d 508
(1974) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 37 N.Y. 719, 337 N.E.2d 128, 374 N.Y.S.2D 615
(1975) (full wrongful death damages imposed where the evidence indicated that the
decedent would have had a "20, say 30, maybe 40076 chance of survival" absent any
malpractice).
63. See Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg. Inc., 445 So.2d 1015 (Fla. 1984).
Relaxing the causation requirement might correct a perceived unfairness to
some plaintiffs who could prove the possibility that the medical malpractice
caused an injury but could not prove the probability of causation, but at
the same time could create an injustice. Health care providers could find
themselves defending cases simply because a patient fails to improve or
where serious disease processes are not arrested because another course of
action could possibly bring a better result.
Id. at 1019-20.
64. See Note, Playing the Percentages, supra note 5, at 453. ("[I]n many

instances, the substantial possibility approach allocates losses less efficiently than
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A small number of courts applying the "substantial possibility"
standard have recognized the inefficiency of the "all-or-nothing"
system of valuation. 65 In response, they have suggested combining
this standard with a proportional method of valuation. Under this
method, a plaintiff would be compensated only for the loss that was
actually caused by the defendant's negligence. While this system would
be more equitable, no jurisdiction has given its unequivocal support
for this approach. 6
3.

Increased Risk of Harm

The "increased risk of harm" standard also applies a lower
burden of production than the "reasonable probability" approach
and allows the issue of causation to reach the jury on a reduced level
of evidence. The standard was introduced in the case of Hamil v.
Bashline.67 In Hamil, the decedent suffered from intense chest pains
and was taken to Bashline Hospital. 68 The emergency room doctor
who was on duty could not be located. When another doctor was
found, he ordered an electrocardiogram (EKG) and then left the
hospital. 69 The EKG machine failed to function due to a faulty
70
electrical outlet and a second machine could not be located. Upon
receiving no further treatment for his condition, the decedent's wife
took him to visit his family physician. Hamil died of a heart attack
does the traditional approach. The defendant is often held liable for the wrongful
death of a patient who would have died notwithstanding the defendant's negligence.").
65. See O'Brien v. Stover, 443 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1971); Mays v. United
States, 608 F. Supp. 1476 (D.C. Colo. 1985); James v. United States, 483 F. Supp.
581 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
66. None of the cases cited in support of this system have expressly adopted it
as a rule of law. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. They have, however,
awarded damages on a proportional basis on the theory that plaintiffs should be
compensated for the losses they have actually sustained.
67. 481 Pa. Super. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978). An increasing number of other
jurisdictions have adopted the standard announced in Hamil. See Chambers v. RushPresbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 155 Ill. App. 3d 458, 508 N.E.2d 426 (1st Dist.
1986), cert. denied; Roberson v. Counselman, 686 P.2d 149 (Kan. 1984); Hastings v.
Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 498 So.2d 713 (La.1986); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp.
Inc., 741 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1987); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop of Puget Sound,
99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983); Thornton v. CAMC, 305 S.E.2d 316 (W. Va.
1983); Ehlinger v. Sipes, 434 N.W.2d 825 (Wis. App. 1988).
68. Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. Super. 256, 262, 392 A.2d 1280, 1283 (1978).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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while taking an EKG in this doctor's office." The decedent's wife
subsequently brought a wrongful death action against the hospital.7 2
In the lower court, expert testimony indicated that Hamil would
have had a seventy-five percent chance of recovery if his condition
had been properly diagnosed and treated. 3 However, at that time
Pennsylvania applied the "reasonable medical certainty" standard,
which required a plaintiff to show to a virtual certainty that the
defendant's conduct was the cause of the damages. 74 Since the plaintiff
in Hamil could not meet this burden, she was foreclosed from
recovery. 75 After numerous appeals, the case was decided by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The court developed an innovative

standard of causation based on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 323(a). This section provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration to
render services to another which he should recognize as nec-

essary for the protection of the other's person or things, is
subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his
undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases
the risk of harm .... 76

The standard the court deliniated is composed of two elements. 77
First, the plaintiff must show under § 323(a) that the defendant's
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 262-63, 392 A.2d at 1283.
Id. at 263, 392 A.2d at 1283.
Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. Super. 256, 263, 392 A.2d 1280, 1283 (1978).
Only one jurisdiction currently applies the "reasonable medical certainty"

standard. See Bertrum v. Wunning, 385 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Mo. App. 1965). The basis
for this may be the fact that the standard possesses three major drawbacks. First,
the inexact nature of medical science would foreclose most plaintiffs from recovery,
see Dimock v. Miller,r202 Cal. 668, 671, 262 P. 311, 312 (1927) ("[If] it is necessary
to demonstrate conclusively .

.

. that the negligence resulted in the injury, it would

never be possible to recover in a case of negligence in the practice of a profession
which is not an exact science."). Second, the standard might confuse some juries.
See Poertner v. Swearingen, 695 F.2d 435 (10th Cir. 1982) (reasonable medical
certainty is not a proper standard of proof when the jury must decide the case on a
preponderance of evidence, since the use of the two standards would confuse the
jury). Finally, the standard of proof requires a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case
to produce a higher level of evidence than in an ordinary negligence case. See
Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 60 I11.2d 418, 328 N.E.2d 301 (1975) (burden of proof
requirements in malpractice actions should not exceed those of an ordinary negligence
case. The burden of proof is sustained if a preponderance of evidence has been
shown).
75. Hamil, 481 Pa. Super. at 263, 392 A.2d at 1283.
76.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 323(a) (1965).

77. See Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. Super. 256, 269, 392 A.2d 1280, 1286
(1978).

1989:575]

LOST CHANCE OF SURVIVABILITY

negligent conduct increased the risk that he would be harmed.7" Once
the plaintiff has met this burden of production, the jury must then
decide whether this increased risk was a substantial factor in causing
the injury.7 9 The second step of the test is derived from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 B, Comment (a); "[The plaintiff]
must make it appear that it is more likely than not that the conduct
of the defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about the

harm."

0

The "increased risk of harm" standard possesses many of the
advantages and disadvantages of the approaches previously noted.

Like the "substantial possibility" rule, it allows the case to go to the
jury on only minimal evidence of causation.8" However, the rule
2
lowers only the burden of production, not the burden of persuasion.
If the jury does not find that the decreased chance of survivability
was a substantial factor in causing the death, the plaintiff is foreclosed

from recovery even though he suffered a statistically verifiable loss.

3

In such situations, the rule allocates the loss to the victim. In this
respect, the standard is as inequitable to plaintiffs as the "reasonable

probability" rule.

4

78. Id. at 269, 392 A.2d at 1286. Traditionally, courts have utilized § 323(a)
of the RESTATEMENT "to define the scope of a defendant's duty to rescue." Note,
Increased Risk of Harm, supra note 4, at 283. Generally, the common law did not
impose any affirmative duty to act. See Bishop v. Chicago, 121 Ill. App. 2d 33, 257
N.E.2d 152 (1st Dist. 1970) (a bystander is not subject to liability where he fails to
take action, no matter how negligent or intentional, to rescue another in distress);
L.S. Ayers & Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86, 40 N.E.2d 334 (1942) (there is no general
duty to go to the aid of a person in danger). However, under § 323(a), once a
defendant has undertaken a course of action or treatment, he is under a duty not to
increase the risk of harm to the victim under his care. Hamil was the first to apply
this section as a standard of causation instead of restricting its use to the elements
of duty and breach of duty. Under the Hamil standard, a plaintiff is allowed to
reach the jury on the issue of causation only by showing that the defendant breached
his duty by increasing the risk of harm to the plaintiff while attempting to give aid.
79. Id. at 269, 392 A.2d at 1286.

80.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 433B comment (a) (1965).

81. See Hamil, 481 Pa. at 269, 392 A.2d at 1286 ("[Tlhe effect of 323(a) is to

relax the degree of certitude normally required of plaintiff's evidence in order to

make a case for the jury as to whether a defendant may be held liable for the
plaintiff's injuries . . ").

82. Id. at 272, 392 A.2d at 1288 n.9 ("The quantum of proof necessary to

warrant a jury verdict is ... a preponderance of the evidence.").
83. See, Note, Playing the Percentages,supra note 5, at 452.
84. Id. ("Because the . .. approach fails to recognize loss of chance as an
independent compensable injury, the allocation of losses under this approach is no
more fair than it is under the traditional approach.").
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The danger also exists, however, that the jury might award the
plaintiff full compensation even though the evidence is insufficient to
prove that the malpractice actually caused the death. Although this
increased risk of liability might deter some physicians from acting
negligently, it also exposes some defendants to liability for damages
they probably did not cause. 5
This anomaly is evidenced in the case of Herskovits v. Group
Health Cooperative.8 6 The defendant in this case misdiagnosed the
decedent's lung cancer as a respiratory problem and treated the
condition with cough syrup.87 By the time the cancer was eventually
diagnosed and properly treated, the decedent's chances of survival
were decreased from thirty-nine percent to twenty-five percent. 8 The
patient died of cancer and his estate brought a wrongful death action
against the doctor. The trial court granted summary judgment for the
defendant on the grounds that causation in fact had not been shown,
since the decedent had a less than even chance of recovery. 89
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed the
decision of the lower court. It held that under the Hamil standard, if
the plaintiff is able to show an increased risk of harm, then the issue
of causation should be allowed to reach the jury. 9° Consequently, it
extended the "increased risk of harm" standard to cases where the
plaintiff cannot show a fifty-one percent level of causation. 91 The
court noted that a higher burden of production would insulate defendants from liability whenever the decedent had a less than even chance
of recovery. 92 However, this deterrence benefit is accomplished by
exposing defendants to liability where the evidence indicates they were
not the cause of the damage.
As noted, the current standards of causation allocate loss in an
inefficient and inequitable manner. In many cases, a plaintiff is either
barred from recovering for his loss or he is compensated for damages

85. See Note, Increased Risk of Harm, supra note 4, at 307
liability and the consequences of high medical malpractice insurance
be a powerful deterrent to medical malpractice.").
86. 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983).
87. Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99 Wash. 2d 609, 611,
475 (1983).
88. Id. at 612, 664 P.2d at 475.
89. Id. at 620-21, 664 P.2d at 480 (Pearson, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 616-17, 664 P.2d at 478.
91. Id. at 619, 664 P.2d at 479.
92. Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99 Wash. 2d 609, 614,
476-77 (1983).

("The risk of
premiums can
664 P.2d 474,

664 P.2d 474,
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that would have occurred even if there were no malpractice.93 This
Comment will now examine whether Illinois has fared any better in
its handling of "lost chance" cases.
III.

ILLINOIS LAW ON "LOST CHANCE" OF RECOVERY

Illinois case law has been rapidly evolving in the area of "lost
chance." Only fourteen years ago, the state was applying the most
stringent standard of causation in all medical malpractice cases,
"reasonable medical certainty." 94 Since that time, the Illinois appellate

courts have applied both the "reasonable probability" 95 and "increased risk of harm ' 96 standards in "lostchance" cases. The Illinois
Supreme Court has not expressly adopted either of these standards

and in the future it is likely to face the difficult problem of how to
decide "lost chance" cases.
The Illinois Supreme Court last examined the element of causa-

97
tion in medical malpractice cases in Borowski v. Von Solbrig. The
plaintiff in Borowski brought a malpractice action claiming that the
defendant's negligent treatment of the plaintiff's injured leg forced

the amputation of the limb.98 The doctor argued that he was entitled
to summary judgment since the evidence did not establish that a better

result would have occurred if the plaintiff had received proper medical
treatment. 99 The court, however, rejected this contention, stating:
It is unnecessary to extend the burden-of-proof requirements

of a medical malpractice case beyond those of an ordinary

negligence case by adding the further requirement that the
plaintiff prove a better result would have been achieved absent
the alleged negligence of the doctor. We have stated ... that
93. See, Note, Playing the Percentages,supra note 5, at 452-53.
94. See Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 14 I11.App. 3d 672, 680, 303 N.E.2d 146,
152 (1973) ("[Ihe causal connection [in malpractice actions] must not be contingent,
speculative or merely possible, but there must be such a degree of probability as to
amount to a reasonable certainty that the causal connection exists."), aff'd, 60 I11.
2d 418, 328 N.E.2d 301 (1975). See also Scardina v. Colletti, 63 I11.App. 2d 481,
484, 211 N.E.2d 762, 765-66 (1965) ("[in malpractice actions] it is necessary for a
plaintiff to show by expert testimony not only that the injury occurred, but that such
an event does not ordinarily occur in the normal course of events without negligence.") (footnotes omitted).
95. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
96. Id.
97. 60 111.2d 418, 328 N.E.2d 301 (1975).
98. Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 60 I11.2d 418, 420, 328 N.E.2d 301, 303 (1975).
99. Id. at 424, 328 N.E.2d at 305.
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the plaintiff must prove that the negligence was the proximate
cause of his injury. Under accepted instructions this burden
must be sustained by proving that the proposition on which
he has the burden (proximate cause) is more probably true
than not true. 1°°
By so holding, the court rejected the "reasonable medical certainty"
rule.' 0' The opinion, however, is vague and it is unclear which standard
the court intended to adopt in its place.10 2 Consequently, Illinois
appellate courts have given different interpretations to Borowski,
citing it as mandatory authority for following either the "reasonable
probability" or the "increased risk of harm" standard. The leading
Illinois cases illustrating these diverse approaches are Curry v.
Summer'03 and Chambers v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical
Center.'4
In Curry, the Fourth District Appellate Court adopted the "reasonable probability" approach to the element of cause in fact in "lost
chance" cases. The decedent, Curry, was a diabetic with complaints
of a cough and difficulty in breathing. 015 A chest x-ray indicated the
decedent suffered from either pneumonia or a pulmonary edema.' °0
The three doctors assigned to the case diagnosed the patient's condi100. Id.
101. See id. By providing that a malpractice plaintiff need only show causation
by preponderance of the evidence, the court rejected the proposition that such
plaintiff must show causation by a "virtual certainty." Thus, the court in Borowski
would not have approved the "reasonable medical certainty" standard. See supra
note 74 and accompanying text.
102. The court stated that the plaintiff must prove causation by a preponderance
of the evidence. Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 60 I11.2d 418, 424, 328 N.E.2d 301, 305
(1975). However, it did not indicate whether it was applying this standard to the
burden of production or the burden of persuasion. See id. If the court had intended
the statement to refer to the burden of production, it would have indicated an
adoption of the "reasonable probability" standard. See supra notes 27-28 and
accompanying text. If it referred only to the burden of persuasion, any of the three
standards ("reasonable probability," "substantial possibility" and "increased risk of
harm") could have been adopted. Also, the First District Appellate Court in Chambers
v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 155 Ill. App. 3d 458, 508 N.E.2d 426
(1st Dist. 1987), cert. denied, interpreted the language that a plaintiff does not have
to show that a better result would have occurred absent the malpractice, as lowering
the burden of production below that required by a preponderance of the evidence.
103. 136 Ill. App. 3d 468, 483 N.E.2d 711 (4th Dist. 1985), cert. denied.
104. 155 Ill. App. 3d 458, 508 N.E.2d 426 (1st Dist. 1987), cert. denied.
105. Curry v. Summer, 136 Ill. App. 3d 468, 471, 483 N.E.2d 711, 713 (4th
Dist. 1985), cert. denied.
106. Id.
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tion as pneumonia without ordering an electrocardiogram to rule out

the presence of a pulmonary edema. 10 7 Curry's condition became
018
progressively worse and he died shortly thereafter.
An autopsy revealed Curry had died from a series of "massive"
heart attacks. 1°9 These attacks had caused Curry's heart to stop
pumping efficiently and consequently, he developed a pulmonary
0 The autopsy findings showed no indication of pneumonia. I"I
edema. 11
Curry's estate brought a wrongful death action against the doctors. 1 2 At trial, the plaintiff's expert witness testified that if the
decedent had been properly diagnosed and treated when he was
initially admitted to the hospital, he would have had a good chance
of surviving the heart attacks." 3 The witness, however, declined to
say whether the patient's chances of recovery with proper care would
have been above fifty-one percent. 114 A witness for the defendants

testified that the doctors had not deviated from accepted medical
practice and that Curry had almost no chance of survival even with
the best medical treatment." 5
The plaintiff requested a jury instruction on the issue of causation

based on the "increased risk of harm" standard of section 323(a) of
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. 116 The instruction, however,

deviated significantly from the standard announced in Hamil v.
Bashline"7 by not including the "substantial factor" element of the
Hamil rule." 8 If the plaintiff's instruction had been followed, the jury
could have imposed liability for the "lost chance" of survivability,
107. Id. at 472, 483 N.E.2d at 714. The defendants did not believe the decedent
was suffering from a cardiac problem since he had not complained of any chest pain.
However, the doctors were aware that diabetics, like the decedent, could suffer from
"silent" heart attacks in which there is no indication of chest pain. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 474, 483 N.E.2d at 715.

110. Curry v. Summer, 136 I11.App. 3d 468, 473, 483 N.E.2d 711, 714 (4th
Dist. 1985), cert. denied.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 474, 483 N.E.2d at 715.
Id. at 471, 483 N.E.2d at 713.
Id. at 473, 483 N.E.2d at 715.
Id.
Curry v. Summer, 136 111.App. 3d 468, 473, 483 N.E.2d 711, 715 (4th

Dist. 1985), cert. denied.

116. Id. at 476, 483 N.E.2d at 717. The plaintiff's instruction provided: "A
person who undertakes to render services to another is liable for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care, if that failure increased the risk
of harm." Id.
117. 481 Pa. Super. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978).
118. See notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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even if it had not found the defendant's negligence actually caused
the death.11 9 The trial judge refused the plaintiff's instruction and
instead instructed the jury on the "reasonable probability" standard
of causation.' 20 The jury found for the defendants and the plaintiff
appealed on the refusal of her instructions.121
On appeal, the Fourth District Appellate Court affirmed the
decision of the trial court. 22 The court noted that the plaintiff had
brought the case as a wrongful death action rather than as a "loss of
chance" action. 23 Based on this determination, it held that if her
instruction had been allowed, the jury might have been mislead into
awarding the full damages for the wrongful death where the evidence
had merely shown that the defendant's actions had increased the risk
of harm to the decedent. 124 The court therefore held the plaintiff's
instruction would result in undue harshness to the defendant and
would violate the traditional standard of causation.125
The plaintiff also cited Hicks v. United States,'26 for the proposition that a defendant should be held liable if he diminished the
decedent's chances of recovery. The court noted that Hicks would
have imposed liability only if a "substantial possibility" of survival
was lost. In contrast, the plaintiff's instruction would allow full
recovery for the loss of any chance of survivability. '27 The court also
noted that Illinois courts had rejected the Hicks decision in Wise v.
St. Mary's Hospital. 2
The court in Curry, relied on the holding of Borowski v. Von
Solbrig, by stating "the plaintiff must establish that more likely than
not the defendant's negligence was the cause of the injury."', 29 The
court interpreted this language as referring to the burden of produc119. Curry, 136 Ill.
App. 3d at 477, 483 N.E.2d at 718.
120. Curry v. Summer, 136 Ill.
App. 3d 468, 474, 483 N.E.2d 711, 715-16 (4th
Dist. 1985), cert. denied.
121. Id. at 471, 483 N.E.2d at 713.
122. Id. at 482, 483 N.E.2d at 721.
123. Id. at 480, 483 N.E.2d 719.
124. Id. at 477-78, 483 N.E.2d at 717-18.
125. Curry v. Summer, 136 Ill. App. 3d 468, 477-78, 483 N.E.2d 711, 717-18
(4th Dist. 1985), cert. denied.
126. 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966).
127. Curry, 136 Ill.
App. 3d at 479-80, 483 N.E.2d at 719.
128. 64 Ill. App. 3d 587, 381 N.E.2d 809 (5th Dist. 1978) (the Fifth District
Appellate Court held Hicks was in direct conflict with the holding of Borowski v.
Von Solbrig, 60 Il1. 2d. 418, 328 N.E.2d 301 (1975), that a plaintiff has to show
causation by a preponderance of evidence).
129. Curry, 136 Il.App. 3d at 480, 483 N.E.2d at 719.
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tion. Consequently, it cited Borowski as mandatory authority for
3 Since the court
adopting the "reasonable probability" standard.
disallowed the plaintiff's "lost chance" argument for all the aforementioned reasons, it retained the "all-or-nothing" method of valuating damages. 3 '
Center,3 2
In Chambers v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical
however, the First District Appellate Court expressly refused to follow
Curry. Instead it adopted the "increased risk of harm" standard
regarding the burden of production. In Chambers, the decedent, Judge
33
Lawrence Chambers, suffered from severe abdominal pains.' Tests
revealed a partial obstruction of the common bile duct which could
34
have been caused by either pancreatic cancer or pancreatitis. Chambers' physician diagnosed pancreatitis and ordered the decedent on
intravenous feeding to allow the pancreas to rest. Subsequently, the
decedent's blood sugar rose to a dangerous level. Without insulin to
35
curb his blood sugar level, the decedent slipped into a diabetic coma.'
Four months later Chambers died. An autopsy revealed that his death
was caused by a malignant pancreatic tumor that had gone undi3 6
agnosed due to his comatose condition. Evidence indicated that the
over-all survival rate of patients with pancreatic cancer is thirty-three
to the lack of treatment the decedent's chance
percent, however, due
37 *
nil.
of recovery was
Chambers' estate brought a wrongful death action against both
the hospital and the doctor. The trial court found for the plaintiff
3
and awarded full damages for the wrongful death. The defendants
appealed, contending that the evidence was insufficient to show that
39
the negligence had been the actual cause of Chambers' death.
4° as persuasive authority
The defendants cited Curry v. Summer'
for adopting the "reasonable probability" standard. The court, however, stated that the Curry decision was in direct conflict with the
holding of Borowski that a plaintiff need not show "a better result
130. Id.
131. Id.
App. 3d 458, 508 N.E.2d 426 (1st Dist. 1987), cert. denied.
132. 155 Ill.
133. Chambers, 155 Il. App. 3d at 460, 508 N.E.2d at 427.
134. Id. at 461, 508 N.E.2d at 428.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 462, 508 N.E.2d at 428.
138. Chambers v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 155 Il.App.
3d 458, 460, 508 N.E.2d 426, 427 (1987), cert. denied.
139. Id.
140. 136 Ill. App. 3d 468, 483 N.E.2d 711 (4th Dist. 1985), cert. denied.
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would have occurred if proper treatment had been given.' ' 41 The
court interpreted this statement as holding that a plaintiff does not
have to prove the decedent had a better than even chance of survival
for the case to get to the jury. The court also interpreted the language
of Borowski, which held the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's
actions were more likely than not the cause of the injury, as referring
only to the burden of persuasion. Consequently the court adopted the
"increased risk of harm" standard for the burden of production. 42
Although Chambers adopted a lower burden of production than
Curry, it too retained the "all-or-nothing" method of valuation. By
focusing on the issue of causation, both decisions failed to deal with
the problems delineated below that arise from this system of loss
allocation. Under the "reasonable probability" standard adopted in
Curry, plaintiffs are foreclosed from recovering for their losses if the
decedent had a less than even chance of recovery. The court in
Chambers attempted to mitigate such harshness by lowering the
burden of production. However, Chambers did not lower the burden
of persuasion. Courts applying the "increased risk of harm" standard
adopted in Chambers would allow plaintiffs to reach the jury even if
the evidence does not indicate that the malpractice caused the death.
However, if the jury correctly applies the rule it would still deny
recovery if the decedent had a less than even chance of survival.' 43
Therefore under the "reasonable probability" and "increased risk of
harm" standards as applied by Illinois courts, plaintiffs face a significant chance of recovering nothing.
Faced with this inequity to plaintiffs, the jury might distort the
burden of persuasion.'" It is possible that a jury might award full
damages in cases where there is insufficient evidence of causation if
their only other option is to deny the plaintiff compensation completely. However, such action would allocate the full loss of the death
to the defendant where his negligence only increased the chance that
45
it would occur.
Both the Curry and Chambers holdings fail to recognize a less
than even chance of recovery as a separate compensable injury in its
own right. However, the fact that a chance of recovery might have
been small, does not necessarily mean its loss is insignificant. The
141. Chambers, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 463-64, 508 N.E.2d at 429-30 (citing Borowski
v. Von Solbrig, 60 I11.2d 418, 328 N.E.2d 301 (1975)).
142. Id. at 464, 508 N.E.2d at 430.
143. See Note, Playing the Percentages, supra note 5, at 451.
144. See King, supra note 4, at 1377-78.
145. Id. at 1377.
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plaintiff has lost not only the then-existing chance of survival, he is
also deprived of the possibility that some future scientific break-

through could extend his life. 46 Although Illinois currently does not
consider the loss of a less than even chance of survival as a compensable injury, it is an absurd proposition that nothing of value has
47
been lost.1

A more equitable rule, on the other hand, would allow the
plaintiff to only sue for this diminished chance of recovery in all
"lost chance" cases. This approach would award damages according
to the magnitude of the chance destroyed by the malpractice. Consequently, it would avoid the inequities inherent in the current ap-

proaches to "lost chance" cases. To avert such injustice, Illinois
courts would have to recognize the "Lost Chance" doctrine.
IV.

PROPOSAL

The deficiencies of both the "reasonable probability" and "increased risk of harm" standards indicate the need to take a new
approach in deciding "lost chance" cases. This formulation must be
equitable to both plaintiffs and defendants and in accord with accepted tort principles of causation.
The proposed .system would recognize "loss of chance" as the
sole form of action in medical malpractice cases where the defendant's
negligence decreased the plaintiff's chances of recovering from a preexisting illness and direct proof of causation is unavailable. 148 In cases
146. Id. at 1378.

147. See James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581, 587 (N.D. Cal. 1980) ("No
matter how small that chance may have been-and its magnitude cannot be ascertained-no one can say that the chance of prolonging one's life or decreasing suffering
is valueless. Accompanying this physical loss is the mental anguish from the awareness
of this lost opportunity.").
148. An increasing number of jurisdictions have adopted the "lost chance" tort
as the sole cause of action in these limited types of malpractice cases. See supra note

6 and accompanying text. However, two commentators have advocated restricting
the "loss of chance" cause of action only to those cases in which the decedent had
a less than even chance of recovery. See Wolfstone & Wolfstone, supra note 6, at
141; Note, Playing the Percentages,supra note 5, at 456 ("[In situations in which it
is more likely than not that the defendant's negligence actually caused the victim's
death, plaintiffs should not be allowed to bring a loss of chance cause of action.
Wrongful death statutes provide such plaintiffs with an adequate and efficient means
of procuring compensation."). While this method would ensure that more plaintiffs
would receive compensation for their injuries, it would still be inequitable to
defendants if their negligence destroyed a greater than even chance of recovery. Since
wrongful death actions award damages on an "all-or-nothing" basis, a defendant
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where the ultimate injury is death, this tort would define the loss as
149
the diminished possibility of survival rather than the wrongful death.
Compensation for this loss would be awarded on a proportional
basis. 150 For example, if a decedent suffered a twenty-five percent
reduction of survivability, his estate could recover only twenty-five
percent of the damages that would have been awarded in a wrongful
death action. 5 ' Hence, in "lost chance" cases, it would be unjust to
award the plaintiff full wrongful death damages since there is always
the possibility that the decedent would not have survived under any

circumstances. 152

In deciding "lost chance" cases the jury would focus primarily
on the issues of causation and damage valuation. The changes that
should be made in existing Illinois law regarding these elements are
outlined below.
A.

THE ELEMENT OF CAUSATION

The test of sufficient causation in "loss of chance" cases would
be virtually identical to the "increased risk of harm" standard.' The
test would be composed of two steps. First, to avoid a directed verdict
the plaintiff must show under section 323(a) of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS

the defendant breached his duty of using due care

by increasing the risk of harm to the decedent. 5 4 If this burden is
met, the jury would then decide whether the preponderance of evidence indicates the tortious act was a "substantial factor" in decreasing the decedent's chances of survival.'
who caused even 51% of the loss would be liable for 10007o of the damages. This
method would therefore overcompensate plaintiffs who have lost a better than even
chance of recovery. See King, supra note 4, at 1387.
149. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
151. See DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 137 (Iowa 1986) ("[T]he better
approach is to allow recovery, but only for the lost chance of survival.") (emphasis
in original); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp. Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 477 (Okla. 1987)
("An award for all damages for the underlying injury, i.e. death, is precluded.")
(emphasis in original).
152. See King, supra note 4, at 1377-79.
153. Currently, two jurisdictions apply the "increased risk of harm" standard
in combination with a proportional system of loss allocation. See Robertson v.
Counselman, 686 P.2d 149 (Kan. 1984); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp. Inc., 741
P.2d 467 (Okla. 1987). See also Note, Increased Risk of Harm, supra note 4, at 305
("The test presented in Hamil permits an adaptation of the [proportional] valuation
theory to the causation problem.").
154. See McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp. Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 477 (Okla. 1987).
155. Id.
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The proposed system would allow plaintiffs to reach the jury on
a minimal level of causal evidence. Unlike the "reasonable probability" approach, the trial judge would not be able to keep a case from
the jury merely because the plaintiff is unable to show causation to a
fifty-one percent level. Consequently, more plaintiffs would be compensated for their losses and the jury would retain its traditional
56
function of deciding the issue of causation.
In "lost chance" cases, the jury would not be forced to speculate
on whether the defendant's actions actually caused the ultimate injury
or death. Instead it would decide whether the malpractice decreased
the chances of a better recovery. This contrasts with the traditional
wrongful death action where the jury must find that the death would
not have occurred but for the malpractice before imposing liability.
By focusing only on the ultimate injury, wrongful death actions often
lead to unjust results where the malpractice only destroyed a possibility
of survival. For example, assume that a physician's negligence reduced
his patient's chances of survival from forty percent to twenty-five
percent. Subsequently, the decedent's estate brings a wrongful death
action. If the jurisdiction applies the "reasonable probability" standard the case would be dismissed since the decedent did not have a
better than even chance of survival. Consequently the plaintiff would
receive no compensation. Under the "substantial possibility" or "increased risk of harm" rules, the case would reach the jury, however,
it would probably not award the plaintiff any compensation for his
loss since the evidence does not indicate that the malpractice caused
the death. However, if the jury incorrectly found for the plaintiff, it
would impose full liability for the wrongful .death even though the
decedent probably would have died even with the best medical treatment.
Conversely, under the proposed system the jury would decide
whether the increased risk of harm was a substantial factor in reducing
the decedent's chances of survival. In the above hypothetical the

156. Chambers v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Lukes Medical Center, 155 I11.App. 3d
458, 465, 508 N.E.2d 426, 431 (1st Dist. 1987), cert. denied. ("Issues which are
sufficient to allow reasonable persons to arrive at different results should never be
determined as matters of law. Whether a person would have had a 33 percent, or a
66 percent, or 100 percent chance to survive but for the negligence of another is a
question of fact properly determined by the jury.") (citation omitted). See also W.
D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
§ 41, at 237 (4th ed. 1971)("[The issue of causation in fact] is a matter upon
which any layman is quite as competent to sit in judgment as the most experienced
court. For that reason, in the ordinary case, it is peculiarly a question for the jury.").
KEETON,
TORTS
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preponderance of evidence would clearly show that the defendant's
conduct was a substantial factor in reducing the decedent's chances
of recovery by fifteen percent. After deciding the issue of causation,
the jury could then award compensation specifically for this loss.
B.

DAMAGES

Under the proposed approach, the plaintiff would be compensated for the injuries he suffered due to the malpractice even if the
negligence had not caused the death. However, defendant would be
liable only for the portion of the loss actually caused by his negligence.
Thus, plaintiffs are neither foreclosed from recovery nor overcompensated for their loss. Consequently, the proposed system is more
equitable than the current "all-or nothing" approach to loss allocation.
Currently, the most comprehensive system of valuating the damages in "lost chance" cases has been proposed by Professor Joseph
King. ' In his seminal article on "Lost Chance," King delineates two
methods of computing these damages. ' The first method is employed
if a chance of avoiding the injury has been destroyed by the malpractice.1, 9 In applying this method, the jury would calculate the compensable value of the decedent's life if he had survived. 16° This value
would take into account his age and earning potential, in addition to
the fact that he suffered from a pre-existing illness. 61 The next step
would be to compute the magnitude of the chance of recovery that
had been destroyed. The sum of damages would be this percentage
multiplied by the compensable value of the decedent's life., 62 For
example, if a patient originally had a forty-eight percent chance of
recovery and the defendant's negligence reduced this possibility of a
cure to fifteen percent, then he would be responsible for thirty-three
percent of the damages. If the plaintiff's total loss was valued at
$150,000, then the defendant would be liable for thirty-three percent
times $150,000 or $50,000.161
The second method of computing damages is employed when a
plaintiff has suffered a definite injury in addition to a loss of chance.'64
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See King, supra note 4, at 1353.
Id. at 1381-87.
Id.at 1382.
Id.
Id.
See King, supra note 4, at 1382.
Id.
Id.
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For example, assume a patient had a thirty percent chance of recovery,
however, he is negligently killed during surgery. Also, assume if he
had recovered from his illness, he would have had a life expectancy
of forty years. Even if he had not been treated, his life expectancy
would have been one year. In such a case, the plaintiff would be
allowed to sue for full damages for the one year of life that was
definitely lost by the negligence.165 In addition, the estate may also
recover for thirty percent of the full damages for the remaining thirtynine years. 166
Professor King's two methods of "lost chance" damage calculations provide the jury with a simple system of computing the
plaintiff's recoverable damages. The jury would consider the statistical
evidence presented by the parties' expert witnesses in determining the
amount of compensation. This statistical evidence, however, would
be used only as a guideline. The jury would be allowed to take into
consideration all facts relevant to the case to equitably allocate the
lOSS.1

67

V.

CONCLUSION

Currently, the Illinois appellate courts apply the "reasonable
probability" and "increased risk of harm" standards of causation in
medical malpractice cases involving lost chance of recovery. Both of
these approaches when combined with an "all-or-nothing" system of
compensation allocate loss in an inefficient and inequitable manner.
Under the present standards, plaintiffs are either completely barred
from recovery or they are compensated for damages that would have
occurred even if there were no malpractice. The proposed "lost
chance" cause of action ameliorates this inequity by compensating
165. Id. at 1382-83.
166. Id. at 1383.
167. See McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp. Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 476 (Okla. 1987)

("[sitatistical evidence ... merely provides a base estimate and is not in itself

sufficient to make the damage determination. Facts relevant to the particular patient
should also be weighed in determining the net reduced figure used to represent the
patient's loss of survival chance attributable to the defendant's negligence."). See
also Note, Playing the Percentages,supra note 5, at 458.

[I]n valuing the loss of chance itself, juries will have to take into account
the specific facts and circumstances surrounding the case. Such factors
should include: the grievousness of the malpractice, the age, health and
family of the patient, his prospects for recovery had there been no negligence,
the simplicity of the procedures which would have detected the injury and
various other intangible information which the jury deems relevant.
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plaintiffs only for the portion of damages actually caused by the
defendant's negligence.
The proposed approach can be applied to the hypothetical case
in the introduction. Mr. Sloane's estate would bring a "loss of
chance" action against Dr. Wellbee. The case would go to the jury
since the evidence indicates the doctor's negligence increased the risk
of harm to the decedent. If the jury found by a preponderance of
evidence that the defendant's actions were a substantial factor in
reducing the decedent's chances of recovery, they could impose liability. Sloane's estate could be compensated directly for the loss of
chance. The amount of compensation would reflect the fact that Dr.
Wellbee's negligence reduced the decedent's chances of survival by
twenty-four percent.
Unlike present Illinois law, the proposed system would not foreclose plaintiffs from recovery merely because they are unable to prove
the defendant's tortious act caused the death. Additionally, defendants
would not be exposed to liability for damages they did not cause.
Therefore, the proposed system avoids the inequities currently existing
in Illinois law and provides a more just method of allocating compensation in "lost chance" cases.
JEFFREY
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